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In recent years, the US, UK and Australia have lowered tax rates on high incomes and 
expanded tax credits and family transfer payments that are withdrawn on the joint 
income of a couple.  These reforms result in significant changes in the structure of 
marginal and average income tax rates.  In this paper we present a case study that 
examines the impact of reforms of this kind on the structure of tax rates on incomes in 
Australia.  We find that the reforms have led to high effective marginal rates across a 
wide middle band of earnings and to a shift towards joint taxation. As is well known, 
joint taxation results in high tax rates on secondary earners, with in consequence 
undesirable effects on both work incentive and fairness of the income distribution. A 
lifecycle analysis of time use and saving decisions indicates strong negative effects on 
female labour supply and household saving. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Over the last decade or more, a number of countries, notably the US, UK and Australia, 
have reduced significantly the progressivity of the rate scale of their formal income tax 
systems by cutting rates at higher income levels.  It is well recognised that these reforms 
have shifted the overall tax burden towards the middle of the earnings distribution during 
a period of increasing inequality.  The same countries have also introduced new, or 
expanded existing, tax credit and family support programs with benefits withdrawn on the 
joint income of a couple.  Examples include the earned income tax credit (EITC) program 
in the US, the child tax credit (CTC) and working tax credit (WTC) in the UK, and the 
Family Tax Benefit (FTB) system in Australia.  It is less well recognised that the 
withdrawal of benefits on joint income under these programs leads to a system of joint 
taxation with a marginal rate scale that is no longer progressive but, instead, exhibits an 
inverted U-shaped profile - the highest marginal rates apply across low to middle family 
incomes.  With joint income as the tax base,  the new rate scale raises the effective 
marginal tax rate on a secondary earner, and therefore tends to shift the overall tax burden 
towards two-earner couples on low to average earnings. 
 
Since the US allows joint filing, the key effect of combining its EITC program with the 
Federal Income Tax is to replace the progressive marginal rate scale of the latter with a 
scale that has higher effective rates on low to middle family incomes, and therefore 
higher effective rates on the income of a secondary earner. In countries such as the UK 
and Australia, which have apparently individual income tax systems, the programs 
simultaneously result in a significant shift from individual to joint taxation under the 
newly created inverted U-shaped rate scale.   
 
The aim of this paper is to show, as a detailed case study, how, through a succession of 
reforms, Australia has moved towards an income tax system of this kind.
1  We show first, 
in Section 2, how increases in the low income tax offset (LITO) combined with tax cuts 
at high income levels in recent Australian Government budgets have shifted the overall 
                                                 
1 For an analysis of the UK and US formal and effective income tax systems, see Apps and Rees (2009).     2
tax burden towards the “middle”.  Following this we explain how the FTB system 
compensates single-earner families on low and average earnings while leaving two-earner 
families uncompensated.  The result is that, though ostensibly based on the progressive 
taxation of individual incomes, we now have a system that closely approximates one of 
joint taxation with the highest marginal rates applying across a wide middle band of 
earnings and to the income of a secondary earner, typically the female partner. 
 
The available evidence on wage elasticities indicates that the labour supply of prime aged 
males tends to be unresponsive to changes in the net wage while that of females in the 
same age category tends to be quite responsive.  If we accept this evidence, the “new” tax 
system can be expected to have significant disincentive effects on female labour supply.
2 
In Sections 2 and 3 we present data that show female hours of work are not only well 
below male hours, they also exhibit a high degree of heterogeneity across seemingly 
identical households.  We argue that both these features of the data can be attributed to 
high tax rates on second earners, together with a poorly developed and costly childcare 
sector.  We go on to explain why, under these conditions, household income is neither a 
fair nor efficient tax base. In Section 4 we present a lifecycle analysis that indicates 
strong negative effects on household saving as well as on labour supply. The central 
thesis of the paper is that, over the last decade or more, Australia has moved towards an 
income tax system that fails in terms of efficiency considerations, and cannot be 
supported on the basis of either vertical or horizontal equity criteria. A concluding 
comment is contained in Section 5. 
 
2  The Australian income tax system 
 
Australia is widely viewed as having an income tax based on individual incomes, with a 
progressive rate scale.  However, as already indicated, a country’s income tax is set not 
solely by the formal rate scale applying to personal income, but in combination with tax 
credits, offsets, exemptions and cash benefits. The focus of the analysis in this section is 
                                                 
2 See Eissa and Hoynes (2004, 2006) and Eissa and Liebman (1996) for studies that estimate the 
disincentive effects of the high tax rates on second earners under the US EITC program.   3
on the structure of marginal and average rates of the Australian income tax system 
resulting from four key policy instruments: 
•  Personal Income Tax (PIT); 
•  Low income tax offset (LITO);  
•  Medicare Levy (ML); and  
•  Family Tax Benefit Part A (FTB-A) and Family Tax Benefit Part B (FTB-B).  
 
Section 2.1 examines the rate structure of the Personal Income Tax when combined with 
the LITO and ML.  We then go on to consider in Section 2.2 the change in the structure 
of rates when FTB-A and FTB-B are included.   
 
2.1  Personal Income Tax, LITO and ML  
 
Table 2.1 lists the formal MTR scale of the PIT and the true scale that applies when the 
LITO is included.
3  Figure 2.1a shows graphically the effect of the LITO on the MTR 
scale of the PIT, and Figure 2.1b presents the resulting profile of ATRs, with respect to 
annual taxable income.   
 
Table 2.1   PIT rate scale and LITO, 2007-08   
Taxable Income  MTR   Taxable Income   MTR + LITO ($750)
$0 - $6,000 
$6,001 - $30,000 
$30,001 - $75,000 







$0 - $11,000 
$11,001 - $30,000 
$30,001 - $48,750 
$48,751 - $75,000 









As we can see, according to the specified formal rate scale, we have a strictly 
progressive, piecewise-linear income tax. However, when the LITO is included, this is no 
longer the case. A higher rate in the dollar applies to incomes from $30,000 to $48,750 
than to the next income band, $48,750 - $75,000.  The LITO raises the zero rated 
threshold from $6,000 to $11,000 and it also raises the MTR from 30 cents to 34 cents in 
the dollar on incomes from $30,001 to $48,750, as shown in Table 2.1.  The LITO is in 
                                                 
3 The 2007-08 LITO is $750, and is withdrawn at a rate of 4 cents in the dollar above a lower income 
threshold of $30,000.   4
fact an entirely redundant policy instrument that serves only to reduce the transparency of 
the higher rate of 34 cents in the dollar in the middle of the scale.  
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When considered in isolation, the LITO might appear to have the advantage of reducing 
ATRs at low income levels. The standard argument along these lines is that an offset is a 
more effective (or less “costly”) use of taxpayers money for assisting those on very low 
incomes than an increase in the zero rated threshold, which provides a benefit to all 
taxpayers above the threshold.    5
 
This argument is fundamentally flawed.  It is based on a misunderstanding of the relevant 
criteria for evaluating a tax system – those of efficiency and fairness.  Given that higher 
income, prime-aged individuals are typically found to have unresponsive labour supplies, 
a more efficient system is likely to be one that retains rate scale progressivity.  In regard 
to fairness, the argument distracts attention from the true distributional outcome of 
reforms of this kind.   
 
If we examine successive increases in the LITO and the simultaneous cuts in rates on 
higher incomes introduced in recent budgets and proposed for future years, we find that 
the effect is to shift a disproportionate share of the tax burden towards middle income 
earners.  To show this, Figure 2.2 plots the ATR profiles of the PIT scale and LITO for 
2004-05 and 2007-08, the proposed rate scale and LITO for 2010-11, and the 
Government’s “aspirational” rate scale and LITO for 2013-14.  The MTRs for 2004-05, 
2010-11 and 2010-14 are listed in Table 2.2 below.  ATRs are calculated for incomes 
indexed by average weekly ordinary time earnings, with 2007-08 as the reference year.   
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Table 2.2   Tax scales: 2004-05, 2010-2011, 2013-2014 
Taxable Income   MTR   Taxable Income   MTR + LITO 
2004-05     (LITO $235) 
$0 - $6,000 
$6,001 - $21,600 
$21,601 - $58,000 







$0 - $7,382 
$7,382 - $21,600 
$21,601 - $27,475 
$27,476 - $58,000 








2010-11        (LITO $1500) 
$0 - $6,000 
$6,001 - $37,000 
$37,001 - $80,000 







$0 - $14,000 
$14,001 - $30,000 
$30,001 - $37,000 
$37,001 - $67,500 
$67,501 - $80,000 









“Aspirational” 2013-14      (LITO $2100) 
$0 - $6,000 
$6,001 - $37,000 






$0 - $20,000 
$21,001 - $30,000 
$30,001 - $37,000 
$37,001 - $82,500 










From around 1996, bracket creep has raised significantly the ATR on average earnings.  
Figure 2.2 shows that the effect of the LITO, together with tax cuts at higher income 
levels, has been to deny individuals on average earnings an equi-proportional rate of 
compensation for the failure to index tax bands. This is indicated by the smaller vertical 
gap between the ATR profiles for 2004-05 and 2007-08, and the close to zero gaps 
between later profiles, across taxable incomes from around $50,000 to $70,000 pa.  
 
From the profile of MTRs we can see that, in an economy with rising tax revenues due to 
bracket creep, the shift to the “middle” is achieved by raising the 30 cents rate to 34 cents 
across low to middle incomes, for example, in 2013-14, across the incomes from $37,000 
to $82,500, while also reducing the top rates.  When we introduce the ML there is an   7
even stronger effect of this kind.
4 To illustrate, we take the case of a two-parent, single-
income family with two dependent children.  For this family, the lower income threshold 
of the ML exemption is $33,841. At this point the exemption is withdrawn at a rate of 10 
cents in the dollar.  This creates eight income tax bands and results in an MTR of 40 cents 
on incomes from $33,436 to $39,335 pa.  This 40 cent rate is followed by a 35.5 cent rate 
and then a 31.5 cent rate.  We see a further shift towards an inverted U-shaped profile of 
MTRs. 
 
                Table 2.3   MTRs for 2-child family: PIT+LITO+ML 2007-08 
Taxable Income   MTR  
$0 - $11,000 
$11,001 – $30,000 
$30,001 - $33,435 
$33,436 – $39,335  
$39,336 - $48,750 
$48,751 - $75,000 












The family tax benefit system has a more profound effect of the same kind on the MTR 
profiles of two-parent families, as the following analysis shows. 
 
2.2 Family  Tax  Benefits  2007-08 
 
Table 2.4 illustrates the effects of the FTB system on marginal and average tax rates for a 
single-earner family with two children under 13, one under 5, as taxable income rises.  
FTB-A provides a cash transfer of $4,460.30 per child under 13 years.  The “maximum 
rate” is withdrawn up to the “base rate” on family income above $41,138 at a rate of 20 
cents in the dollar. The base rate is $1890.70 and is withdrawn at a rate of 30 cents in the 
dollar on joint income above $95,192.  The result is that a MTR of 55.5 cents in the dollar 
applies across the middle income band of $41,319 - $67,014.   At $95,193 the MTR rises 
to 71.5 cents in the dollar due to the withdrawal of the base rate at 30 cents in the dollar.  
                                                 
4 The ML is normally calculated at 1.5 per cent of taxable income, with exemption categories or reductions 
based on family income. There is a surcharge for individuals and families on higher incomes who do not 
have private patient hospital cover – calculated at an additional 1 per cent of taxable income.    8
FTB-B is a cash transfer of $3,584.30 for a child under 5 and is withdrawn on second 
earner's income above $4,380.0,
5 and so the single-earner family receives the whole 
amount. 
 
Table 2.4   MTRs and ATRs:  Single-earner family  
Taxable income   PIT+LITO+ML+FTBs 
MTR ATR 
$0 - $11,000 
$11,001- $30,000 
$30,001 - $33,435 
$33,436 - $39,335 
$39,336 - $41,318 
$41,319 - $67,014   
$67,015 - $75,000 
$75,001 - $95,192 
$95,193 - $107,797  



























The effect of withdrawing the maximum rate of FTB-A from $41,319, together with the 
higher MTR due to the LITO and the withdrawal of the ML exemption, is to replace the 
progressive PIT rate scale with one that has very high rates towards the lower end and 
middle of the income distribution. ATRs are progressive due to family tax benefits.  We 
have a negative income tax system for the single-earner, two-child family up to around 
$50,700.  The impact on the two-earner family is, however, very different. 
 
MTRs and ATRs on the second income depend on the primary earner’s income because 
FTB-A and the ML exemption are withdrawn on joint income.  Table 2.5 lists the tax 
rates on the second income when the primary earner’s income is $40,000 and there are 
two children under 13, with one under 5.  A MTR of 21.5 cents applies to her earnings 
from $1,319 to $4,380 due to the withdrawal of FTB-A, plus the ML of 1.5 per cent.  At 
$4,380 her MTR goes up an additional 20 cents, to 41.5 cents in the dollar, due to the 
withdrawal of FTB-B. The withdrawal of FTB-B on the second income, together with the 
withdrawal of FTB-A on joint income, has the effect of denying the second earner the 
                                                 
5 The benefit is fully withdrawn at $22,302.   9
zero-rated threshold of $11,000.  At $11,000 her MTR rises to 56.5 cents in the dollar, 
because her income hits the 15 per cent rate of PIT scale. 
 
               Table 2.5   MTRs and ATRs on the second income   
 
Taxable income 
Tax rates on second earnings 
MTR ATR 
$0 - $1,318 
$1,319 - $4,380 
$4,381 - $11,000 
$11,001 - $22,302 
$22,303 - $27,014 
$27,015-$30,000 















      Primary income = $40,000 pa 
 
 
Because FTB-A, excluding the base rate, is fully withdrawn at a family income of 
$67,014, the second earner’s MTR falls to 16.5 cents in the dollar, the rate on personal 
income plus the ML, at $27,015.  At $30,000 her MTR is 36.5 cents in the dollar, the sum 
of the 30 per cent rate on personal income, the 4 cents withdrawal rate of the LITO, and 
the ML rate.  At $40,000 the second earner has faced such high MTRs on her earnings up 
to $22,302 that her ATR is close to 40 per cent. 
 
2.3 Diagrammatic  exposition 
 
This section illustrates diagrammatically the selective taxation of second earners under 
the ML and Family Tax Benefit system, and the resulting shift towards joint taxation.   
The figures compare MTRs and ATRs faced by the primary and second earner in a 
household that switches from being single to two-earner – in other words, a household 
that switches “type” by changing the labour supply of the female partner as second 
earner. We compare three types: 
•  SE    A single-earner household in which the male works full time in the market 
and the female works full time at home 
•  PT   A two-earner household in which the male works full time in the market and 
the female divides her time equally between market work and household 
production, and earns half the market income of the male.   10
•  FT   A two-earner household in which both partners work full time in the market 
and earn the same incomes. 
 
MTRs and ATRs faced by each partner are computed as a function of primary income.  
We compare the tax rate profiles of the PIT and LITO with those for the full system 
including FTBs and the ML, for a household with zero non-labour income, no gender 
wage gap and with two dependent children under 13 (one under 5).  We also present 
profiles of ATRs on the second income for selected levels of primary income. 
 
MTRs and ATRs by primary income 
 
Figure 2.3a plots the MTR profiles for the PIT with the LITO included, and Figure 2.3b, 
the profiles for the full system, with respect to primary income.  The MTR profiles of 
primary earners are denoted by MTR1 followed by their household type, SE, PT or FT.  
Similarly, the MTR profiles of the second earner are denoted by MTR2 followed by 
household type. 
 
As indicated in Figure 2.3a, the MTR profiles of primary earners and of the second earner 
in the FT household coincide because each earns the same income and the tax base is 
individual income. The second earner in the PT household faces a lower MTR because 
she has a lower income
6 apart from where the withdrawal of the LITO raises her MTR to 
34 cents before the 40 cents in the dollar rate becomes effective.  When we move to the 
full system in Figure 2.3b we see that FTBs and the ML introduce much higher MTRs 
across average earnings for the SE household.  For the FT and PT households the higher 
rates apply at lower income levels. This is a feature of joint taxation: at any given level of 




                                                 
6 As shown in Boskin and Sheshinski (1983), a lower tax on a second earner with a lower income is 
consistent with the Ramsey rule for efficiency. It can also be supported on distributional grounds, as shown 
in Apps and Rees (2007).  See also Apps and Rees (1999)   11
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Figure 2.4a plots the profiles of ATRs on household income due to the PIT and LITO and 
Figure 2.4b, those for the full system.  In each figure the ATR profiles of the three 
household types are denoted by ATR SE, ATR PT and ATR FT, respectively.  The     
graphs also show ATR profiles of the second earner in the PT and FT households, ATR2 
PT and ATR2 FT, calculated as the additional tax the household pays due to the second 
earnings.   12
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In Figure 2.4a the ATR profiles for the SE and FT households also coincide, again 
because the tax base is individual incomes.  Note, however, that while the two household 
types face the same ATR at any given level of primary income, the FT household pays 
twice as much tax because both partners work full-time in taxed market production. In   13
effect, they contribute twice as much to financing the FTB system. The PT household 
pays less than twice as much because the second earner has a lower income.  
 
Figure 2.4b shows the increase in the tax burden on the two-earner household due to the 
FTB system. The withdrawal of benefits on joint income and on the income of the second 
earner raises the ATR on the household’s additional income due to the second partner 
going out to work. The higher ATR on her income raises, in turn, the ATR on household 
income in the two-earner households.  The FT household now pays more than twice as 
much tax as the SE household. Again, this is a characteristic feature of joint taxation.  
 
ATRs on the second income 
 
Figure 2.5 plots the ATR profile faced by the second earner as her income rises, for four 
level of primary income:  $30,000, $40,000, $50,000 and $60,000 pa.   (Note that Table 
2.5 gives the figures for ATRs on a second income for the case of the family with a 
primary income of $40,000 pa).  The graph shows that in all four cases, the second earner 
reaches high ATRs at relatively low income levels. 
 
Figure 2.5   ATRs on second income at selected primary income levels 
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Taxes on second earners and their families at the levels indicated, together with a lack of 
access to affordable, high quality childcare, can be expected to have strong negative 
effects on female labour supply, not only during the child rearing years but throughout 
the entire lifecycle, for reasons discussed in detail in Section 4. 
 
 
2.4  Impact on “in-work” families 
 
We now turn to an empirical analysis of the impact of the rate structure we have 
described on families “in-work”, using data for a sample of 1945 couple income units 
drawn from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Income and Housing Survey (IHS) 
(2003-04). The sample is selected on the criteria that the couple income unit has 
dependent children and at least one parent is employed.  Families in which both parents 
are unemployed or out of the workforce are excluded in order to focus on the income tax 
and FTB system, rather than on the wider welfare system.
7  The sample is also limited to 
families in which at least one parent earns above $15,000 per annum, earnings are 
principally from wages and salaries, and neither parent has a negative income from 
investments or unincorporated enterprises.  The parent with the higher private income is 
treated as the primary earner.
8  The male partner is the primary earner in over 87 per cent 
of records. All incomes are indexed to the 2007-08 financial year. 
 
As in the preceding section, the tax burden on the primary earner is calculated as the tax 
the family would pay if it had only one earner, that is, if the second earner withdrew from 
work and therefore reported zero earnings. The burden on the second earner is then 
calculated as the increase in the family’s tax burden when her earnings are included in 
family income.  We present profiles of ATRs for three household types: single-earner 
(SE), two-earner with the second in part-time work (PT), and two-earner with both 
                                                 
7 This excludes very few records. Of male partners in the full sample of families, 83.6 per cent are in full 
time work, 6.7 per cent are in part-time work and 2.5 per cent are unemployed.  27.9 per cent of married 
mothers are in full time employment.  37.6 per cent are in part time work and 2.3 per cent report being 
unemployed.  Only a quarter of one per cent of families reports both parents as unemployed. 
8 Private income is income from all non-government sources such as wages and salaries, profits, investment 
income and superannuation. See ABS (2005).   15
partners in full time work (FT).
9  Table 2.6 first of all shows the distribution of household 
types by quintiles of primary income. Note that the three types tend to be fairly evenly 
distributed across quintiles, apart from a slight tendency for two-earner households to 
predominate in the middle quintiles. 
 
Table 2.6   Household type by primary income 
Quintile  1 2 3 4 5  All 
Primary  income  32299 45349 56588 70157  125060  66096 
SE %  44.7 31.0 30.4 27.0 36.3 33.9 
PT %  29.9 34.4 37.4 42.2 38.1 36.4 
FT %  25.4 34.6 32.2 30.8 25.6 29.7 
 
 
Table 2.7 reports the ATR on the household income of each household type and on the 
second income of the PT and FT household (ATR2 PT and ATR2 FT), by quintiles of 
primary income.  The overall data means in the final column show that, on average, 
primary earners in the SE household pay $7,673 in tax.  The PT household’s tax is almost 
double, at $13,575, because, on average, the second earner pays $6,533 on an income of 
only $21,357. For the FT household the family tax burden rises to $17,437, with the 
second earner contributing $11,548.  A striking feature of the results is that the absolute 
burden on the second income tends to be relatively constant across the distribution. 
Because second incomes tend to rise with primary income, the highest ATRs on second 
incomes appear in the bottom two quintiles. 
 
The highest ATR, that of 35.1 per cent, applies to the incomes of PT second earners in 
quintile 2, where the average second income is only $20,320 pa. What this means is that a 
married mother in quintile 2 who decides to work part time in the market rather than full 
time at home will, on average, earn around $20,000 and lose over a third in taxes and 
reduced FTBs. She will also contribute more to GST revenue, because her additional 
income will be spent at least partly on GST rated goods and services as substitutes for 
those she could produce herself by working full time at home. 
 
                                                 
9 “Full time” is defined as employed 35 hours per week or more.    16
Table 2.7   Tax burdens by primary income  
Quintile 1  2  3  4  5  All 
SE           
Net tax $pa  -8081  -3051  2929  8578  39161  7673 
ATR SE %  -22.6  -6.3  4.7  11.4  26.4  11.3 
PT           
Second earnings $pa  15753  20320  21411  23869  23846  21357 
Tax on second earnings $a  5017  7126  6653  6561  7062  6533 
ATR2  PT  %  31.8  35.1  31.1  27.5 29.6 30.6 
Net household tax $a  -3202  4902  8945  14397  37829  13575 
ATR PT %  -6.7  7.3  11.3  15.2  25.3  14.9 
FT           
Second earnings $pa  21732  31964  37307  43554  49422  36827 
Tax on second earnings $a  7545  10248  11172  13507  15293  11548 
ATR2  FT  %  34.7  32.1  29.9  31.0 30.9 31.4 
Net household tax $a  804  8772  14976  22658  41905  17437 
ATR FT %  1.4  11.2  19.6  19.6  25.5  17.3 
 
 
An objection that may be raised to the preceding analysis is that it fails to control for 
demographics, for example, it might be argued that the FT household has fewer and older 
children, and that this accounts significantly for differences in tax burdens by type.  To 
show that this is not the case, Table 2.8 presents ATRs for the representative two-child 
family that switches type from SE to PT or FT, as defined section 2.3.  Recall that the 
primary earner works full time in all three cases, there is no gender wage gap and non-
labour incomes are zero. Thus the second income in the PT household is half that of the  
 
Table 2.8   Two-child family: tax burdens by primary income  
Quintile  1 2  3 4  5 
SE         
Net tax $pa  -8873 -2949 2975  9335  35416 
ATRH SE %  -27.5 -6.4 5.3  13.3  28.3 
PT         
Tax on second earnings $a  5280  10008  8688  11702  17881 
ATR2  PT %  32.7 44.1 30.7 33.4  28.4 
Net household tax $a  -3593  7064  11663  21037  53297 
ATR PT %  -7.4  10.4  13.7  20.0  28.6 
FT         
Tax on second earnings $a  12842  16666  21876  24066  42584 
ATR2  FT %  39.8  36.8  38.7  34.3  34.1 
Net household tax $a  3969  13717  24852  33401  78000 
ATR FT %  6.1  15.1  22.0  23.8  31.2 
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primary earner, and in the FT household, equal to primary earnings.  The figures for each 
quintile are calculated for the data means of primary income reported in Table 2.6. 
 
ATRs on the second income in the lower quintiles are even higher than indicated in Table 
2.7.  For example, the second earner in quintile 2 on only $22,675 pa faces an ATR of 
over 44 per cent, almost 10 percentage point higher than the previous result.     
 
3  Household income: an unfair tax base 
 
If families with the same wage rates and demographic characteristics were observed to 
make the same time allocation decisions, then, all else being equal, we could reasonably 
expect to find a strong correlation between household income and family welfare. Under 
these conditions, a progressive tax on household income would not necessarily be unfair 
in terms of its distribution of burdens across household types. It would, of course, 
discriminate against the second earner, but not against low wage two-earner families. 
 
However, with heterogeneity in the labour supply of one parent, typically the mother, this 
is no longer the case.  Furthermore, the problem of errors in a welfare ranking defined on 
household incomes becomes especially serious when, as the analysis to follow will show, 
the profile of male earnings, and therefore of primary earnings, for full time work is 
relatively flat across the middle of the distribution and then rises sharply towards the top. 
 
Table 3.1 gives data means for the average market hours of primary and second earners, 
by quintiles of primary income, for the sample of 1945 “in-work” families from the ABS 
2003-04 SIH. The sample is again split into the three household types, SE, PT and FT, 
based on data for employment status, as in Table 2.6. Since the male is the primary earner 
in the vast majority of cases, the quintile profiles of hours highlight gender differences in 
labour supply and the high degree of heterogeneity in the market hours of married 
mothers as second earners, at every level of primary income.  Married mothers employed 
full time work almost the same hours as married men.  Those employed part time work 
less than half male hours.    18
 
Table 3.1   Labour supplies of household types, by primary income 
Quintile  1 2 3 4 5  All 
SE        
Primary  market  hours  pa  2062 2240 2346 2380 2531 2296 
PT        
Primary market hours pa   2154  2315  2318  2382  2532  2351 
Second  market  hours  pa  1050 1098 1064 1155 1054 1088 
FT        
Primary  market  hours  pa  2078 2201 2229 2354 2512 2272 




Table 3.2 presents data means for primary and second earnings for each household type, 
by quintiles of primary income. Figure 3.1 presents the results graphically. A crucial 
feature of the earnings profiles is the relatively flat segment across the middle quintiles.  
This means that the position of a family in a ranking defined on household income will be 
very sensitive to the earnings, and therefore to the labour supply, of the second earner 
because it will take only a small increase in her earnings to shift a family from a low 
percentile of family income to a significantly higher point in the distribution.  
 
Table 3.2   Primary and second earnings by primary income 
Quintile  –  primary  income  1 2 3 4 5  All 
SE        
1.  Primary  earnings  $pa  32212 44816 54238 70071  131886  66362 
PT        
2.  Primary  earnings  $pa  31409 44439 55987 67056  117324  65357 
3.  Second  earnings  $pa  15753 20320 21411 23869 23846 21357 
FT        
4.  Primary  earnings  $pa  32739 44763 55480 68637  104446  60437 
5. Second earnings $pa  21732 31964 37307 43554 49422 36827 
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This is illustrated in Table 3.3.  The table gives the quintile means for household income, 
followed by the quintile distributions of the three household types.  As we would expect, 
in contrast to the ranking by primary income (Table 2.6), the vast majority of single-
earner families are in the lower quintiles.   
 
The upper limit of quintile 1 is $50,824, and the lower limit of quintile 4 is $86.857. A 
single-earner family with an income of, say, $45,000 will be located in quintile 1. If the 
family switches “type”, with the second partner working full time also for $45,000, it will 
be re-ranked from quintile 1 to quintile 4.  If the household has a preschool child, much 
of the second net income might be spent on childcare. Clearly, such a household could 
not be said to have the same standard of living as another in which only one parent needs 
to work full time to earn $90,000 while the other works full time at home. To argue to the 
contrary it is necessary to assume that home childcare makes little to no contribution to 
family welfare.    
 
   20
 
Table 3.3   Household type by household income 
Quintile  1  2 3 4  5 All 
Household income $pa  38604  60256 77671 98271 160411 87630 
SE %  67.2  42.8 23.0 15.3  21.7  33.9 
PT %  21.9  40.1 42.1 41.8  36.2  36.4 
FT %  10.9  17.1 34.9 42.9  41.8  29.7 
 
 
The fundamental deficiency of a household income ranking is that it is defined on an 
income variable that omits home production, appropriately weighted by price. The 
ranking is driven by the labour supply of the second earner, and is therefore negatively 
correlated with time allocated to domestic work and childcare. 
 
4  Incentive effects  
 
This section presents data on lifecycle labour supplies, the allocation of time to childcare 
and domestic work, and government spending on childcare, that offer an explanation for 
gender differences in labour supply and wage elasticities.  The section also presents 
profiles of household saving over the lifecycle which suggest that high tax rates on 
second earners, together with limited public funding for childcare, have strong negative 
effect on household saving as well as on female labour supply.  
 
4.1  Household labour supply 
 
Broad comparisons of participation and employment rates are sometimes mistakenly 
interpreted to indicate that male and female labour supplies have now largely converged.  
However household survey data show that there is still a large gap between male and 
female hours of work in most OECD countries.
10  In Australia around 88 per cent of all 
males and 72 per cent of all females aged from 25 to 59 years are employed - a difference 
                                                 
10 For comparisons across Australia, Germany, the UK and US, see Apps and Rees (2009).    21
of only 16 percentage points.
11  However, over 80 per cent of the males are employed full 
time, while only 38.4 per cent of females in the same age category work full time.  
Similar rates are obtained when the sample is limited to couples:  92 per cent of males 
and 73 percent of females are employed.  Almost all prime aged married males - 85 per 
cent - work full time, but only 34 per cent of prime aged married females are in full time 
work.  The result is that married women work around half the hours of married men. 
These figures also reveal the very high degree of heterogeneity in female labour supply. 
While male labour supply shows relatively little variation, with almost all men working 
full time, females are distributed more evenly between zero hours and full time work.  
 
Heterogeneity in female labour supply is strongly associated with children, as we would 
expect. However, controlling for demographics, as well as for wage rates and non-labour 
incomes, leaves much of it unexplained.  In fact, significant heterogeneity emerges only 
with the arrival of the first child. To see this, it is useful to compare the labour supplies of 
couples across four broad lifecycle phases: a pre-child phase;
12 a 0-4 child (or pre-school) 
phase in which the youngest child is under 5 years, a 5-17 child phase in which the 
youngest child is 5 years or older, and a post-child phase, in which there are no longer 
children under 18 years present.  Figure 4.1 presents histograms of male and female hours 
of market work in these phases based on 2005 HILDA data for the "usual weekly hours 
of work" of partners aged from 25 to 59.
13   The first band of the histograms represents 0 
to 4 hours and subsequent bands, increments of 10 hours.  
 
In the first phase, the profiles closely match - partners of prime working age tend to work 
full time and for the same hours, suggesting they have the same preferences.
14  In the 0-4  
                                                 
11 The figures are based on data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey 
(HILDA), Wave 5, 2005. 
12 This phase includes all records in which there are no children present in the household and the female 
partner is under 42 years. 
13 The numbers of male and female records in phases 1 to 4 are: phase 1, 330 male and 284 female; phase 2, 
597 male and 582 female; phase 3, 742 male and 749 female; phase3: 415 male and 525 female. 
14 There are relatively few records in this phase because there are few young married couples without 
children. However, when we include singles who have not yet had children, and who are therefore 
essentially in the same lifecycle phase, we obtain similar results from much larger samples. Almost all men 
and all women not in higher education work full time prior to having children. 
   22
 







































































































child phase, the proportion of men working full time remains about the same, while that 
of women falls dramatically. At the same time, a high degree of heterogeneity in female 
labour supply emerges, with 60 per cent remaining in work but less than 20 per cent in 
full time work.  In the 5-17 child phase, full time female employment rises to 31 per cent. 
Around 24 per cent continue to work less than 5 hours per week. In the post-child phase, 
the proportion of females reporting working less than 5 hours per week rises to a third, 
and around a third work full time. Thus, in the post-child phase female labour supply 
remains well below its pre-child level, indicating a high degree of “persistence” in the 
labour supply decision made in the pre-school phase.
15 
 
                                                 
15 This is consistent with the results of panel data studies for the US.  See, for example, Shaw (1989, 1994).   23
While the dramatic change in the profile of female hours from phase 1 to phase 2 
indicates a strong association between the decision to have children and the labour supply 
decisions of married women, the high degree of heterogeneity across seemingly similar 
households suggests that the relationship cannot be captured by the simple view that 
children “cause” the reduction in female labour supply. To the contrary, we would argue 
that, given the decision to have children, the observed changes in female labour supply 
are driven by the economics of investment in the care and education of children, much of 
which is directly influenced by government policy, and by the gender wage gap. 
 
The argument is straightforward. In phase 1 there is a low demand for home-produced 
goods and services because there are few of the kinds of goods and services couples in 
this phase consume for which there are not good, affordable market substitutes, and so 
there is a low demand for domestic labour in this phase. Put simply, there's nothing much 
to do in the home, and so it would make no sense for either partner to specialise in 
household production, or for singles who have not yet had children to do so. Moreover, 
the gender wage gap is likely to be less significant in this early phase. These conditions 
explain why almost all males and females who have not yet had children, whether single 
or married, work full time and have close to the same average weekly hours. 
 
The arrival of children creates a very large demand for their care and for investment in 
their education. While governments has taken over much of the role of investing in the 
education of children once they reach school age, it has largely neglected to invest in the 
care and education of those under school age.  The result is that market childcare can be 
very costly.  At the same time, as shown in Section 2, the Australian income tax system 
reduces significantly the net income of the second earner. These policies undermine the 
capacity of a second earner to finance childcare, especially when her future wage is 
uncertain and she faces an imperfect capital market in which the borrowing rate is above 
the lending rate.
16    
 
                                                 
16 See Apps PF and R Rees (2003).   24
Childcare can be provided by some combination of parental time and services bought in 
from the market. The opportunity cost of parental childcare is determined by the present 
value of the current and future net market income foregone. The higher the effective tax 
rate on the second earner, and the more costly and difficult it is to access market 
childcare, the more of it will be provided at home, other things being equal. The demand 
for childcare then implies a large induced demand for household production and 
introduces a fundamental change in the work choices of couples, which will reflect the 
relative costs of each partner's time.  Moreover, withdrawal from the labour market by the 
female as the lower wage partner in phase 2 can lead to a lower wage due to loss of 
human capital and career possibilities.
17  This effect offers an explanation for the strong 
persistence of female labour supply decisions made in phase 2 into later phases, including 
the post-child phase. 
 
4.2  Lifecycle labour supply and saving 
 
In this section we extend the preceding analysis to include seven phases. We present 
more detailed evidence on the time use of household members outside the market and on 
labour supply and saving, based on data for all couples drawn from the ABS 2003-04 
Household Expenditure Survey (HES) combined with information on time use from ABS 
1997 Time Use Survey (TUS).
18  The sample of couples contains 4228 records.  
 
To highlight the lack of government support for children below school age, we partition 
households in the “Child 0-4” phase in Figure 4.1 into two sub-groups: families with 
preschool children only and those who have both preschool and older children. We also 
split the “Child 5-17” phase into two sub-groups: families with school children aged 5 to 
15 only and those who also have older dependent children.  The latter phase includes 
families with dependent children aged 18 and over who are still in school or in a post-
school education program. There are therefore seven phases as follows: 
                                                 
17 An extensive literature on work related human capital accumulation includes the contributions of 
Eckstein and Wolpin (1989), Altug and Miller (1998) and, more recently, Imai and Keane (2004) and 
Olivetti (2006), among others. 
18 For further detail, see Apps and Rees (2003).   25
 
1:  adult members do not yet have children 
  2:  children aged 0-4 only - preschool age 
  3:  children aged 0-4+ older children 
  4.  school children aged 5 and under 15  
            5.  dependent children aged 15-24 years - high school, tertiary, etc.  
  6:  adults are still of working age but children have left home 
  7:  adults are retired 
 
Table 4.1 presents weighted data means for the allocation of time to market and domestic 
work, and to home childcare, in each of these phases.
19  The table also reports median 
household saving in each phase.
20 Figure 4.2 shows graphically the profiles of male and 
female labour supplies across the phases and Figure 4.3, the allocation of time to 
domestic work and child care. 
 
      TABLE 4.1  Market, domestic and childcare hours and household saving 
 
Phase 
Female hours pa   Male  hours  pa  Median 
saving*  Market Domestic Childcare   Market  Domestic Childcare 
1  1820  896 -  2140  605 -  7754 
2  799 1215 2291  2125  668  872  3315 
3  694  1402  2164  2076  703 841 506 
4  1021 1475  1508  2046  798  522  1910 
5  1263  1431 234  2036 637  144 6152 
6  1113 1494  -  1953  806  -  7360 




The time use profiles provide evidence of strong substitution of household production, 
consisting mostly of childcare, for market labour supply by married women.  In the pre-
child phase, the allocation of time to household production involves only domestic work 
and is relatively low.  The time allocation decisions of partners in phase 2 are very 
different. Female market hours drop to well below half their phase 1 level. Time spent on  
 
 
                                                 
19 The number of records is 503, 385, 383, 644, 592, 762 and 959 in phases 1 to 7, respectively. 
20 Saving is computed as total weekly household income less total expenditure excluding the principal 
component of mortgage repayments, capital housing costs and superannuation and life insurance. Note that 
total expenditure includes income tax and so saving is, in effect, computed as net income less consumption 
expenditure.   26
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household production rises dramatically, to a total of 3406 hours in phase 2 due to over 
2000 hours of childcare.  In phase 3, female hours drop even further and childcare hours  
remain at much the same level.  This is not surprising because families in this phase still 
have an average of 1.16 preschool children, as well as school children. In phase 4 there 
are no pre-schoolers, and so household production hours fall significantly due to a fall in   27
childcare hours, and market hours rise from their low point of 694 hours pa to 1021 hours 
pa.  In phase 5, female hours rise to 1263 pa, a level that is still well below the phase 1 
level and well below male hours, even thought the children are in their late teenage years 
or in tertiary education. On entering the post-child phase, female market hours tend to fall 
while domestic work remains significantly higher than in phase 1.  
 
Males also increase their total hours of household production from phase 2 onwards, but 
only to a level that is a small fraction of female hours. The additional hours are due to 
time spent on childcare.  These data indicate that, unlike married females, who substitute 
away from both market work and leisure from phase 2 onwards, married males tend to 
substitute away from leisure only.  The data means indicate that, on average, females 
have less leisure than males during the child rearing years.   The fall in the leisure of both 
partners suggests that the household is not using the capital market to smooth 
consumption.
21   
 
From the profile of median saving it might appear that household saving tracks the 
presence of children. However, as we show later, household saving strongly tracks female 
labour supply. The household's consumption expenditure on market goods, as opposed to 
its implicit expenditure on the allocation of time to domestic work and childcare, also 
tracks female labour supply because it draws on household income which, as shown in 
Section 3, tracks female labour supply. 
 
The data available on in-kind government benefits suggest that at least part of the 
observed gender differences in time allocation decisions can be attributed to variation in 
government support for childcare and education with the age of a child.  Table 4.2 
presents lifecycle profiles of bought-in childcare and government spending on in-kind 
childcare and education benefits.  The table also lists the number of dependent children in 
each phase.  The lifecycle profile of government in-kind childcare and school benefits 
shows the dramatic rise in government spending when a child reaches school age.  In 
phase 2, in-kind childcare benefits average only $1413 pa.  In phase 3 it is slightly higher, 
                                                 
21 See Apps and Rees (2003).   28
at $1626.  However, because families in this phase have an average of 1.4 school 
children, they receive over $10,000 in additional education benefits, which amount to an 
in-kind subsidy of over $7000 per school child.  There is still an average of 1.2 preschool 
children present and so it remains very costly for the second earner to go out to work. In 
phase 4, government spending on in-kind education benefits rises to $13,905 pa. There 
are no pre-schoolers and so it is not surprising to find that female hours rise significantly, 
and continue to rise into the next phase. 
 







In-kind school  
benefits* 
2  1.41  1413 424 
3  2.57  1626 10795 
4  1.93  256 13905 
5  2.85  - 9219 
      * 2003-04 $pa 
 
The preceding figures are data means for a sample of households that make very different 
decisions concerning time use and saving within each phase.  To examine further the 
issue of female labour supply heterogeneity and household saving, we partition 
households within each phase into two “types” across phases 2 to 6, defined on median 
female hours.  We label households in which the female works less than median hours 
type H1 and those in which she works above median hours, type H2.   
 
Figure 4.4 presents the labour supply profiles of each type across phases 2 to 6.  The 
results reflect the especially strong substitution of home childcare for market work by the 
H1 household, together with substitution away from leisure.  In the case of the H2 
household, there is much stronger substitution away from leisure, suggesting that married 
mothers who choose to work longer hours in the market are faced with having less leisure 
over the entire lifecycle.  Note that the average number of children in the H1 household is 
only marginally higher than in the H2 household in each phase.
22 
 
                                                 
22 The average number of children in the H1 household is 1.51, 2.77, 1.97 and 1.58, in the H2 households, 
1.30, 2.36, 1.89 and 1.45, in phases 2 to 6 respectively.   29
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Figure 4.5 plots the lifecycle profiles of median saving for each household group, and the 
profile for the full sample.  The figure shows graphically the strong tendency for 
household saving to track female labour supply.  This is not surprising, given that the H1 
household has chosen to substitute domestic for market work and therefore has less 
market income available for the purpose of saving.  Median household saving of H1 
households is well below that of H2 households from phase 2 to retirement.  In phase 1, 
median saving is high because almost all female partners work full time.  In phase 2 there 
is a sharp fall in the median of the full sample, due to a dramatic fall in the saving of H1.  
The median saving of the H1 household is actually negative in phases 2 and 3.  
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The diverse saving decisions of the two household groups cannot be attributed to family 
size. Controlling for the effects of family size, lifecycle phase and the net income of each 
partner using regression analysis generates profiles that show a wider gap in household 
saving. The result is driven by a coefficient on the net income of the female partner that is 
around twice that on primary net income, indicating a much higher propensity to save 
from her net earnings.
23  An additional child is found to have a large negative effect, but 
because the two household types have close to the same number of children, family size 
explains very little of the additional saving of the H2 household, evaluated at data means.  
A formal model of the joint determination of female labour supply and household saving 
over the lifecycle that generates similar profiles can be found in Apps and Rees (2003).
24 
 
These results suggest that household decisions concerning labour supply and household 
saving are made simultaneously, and in response to net of tax wage rates and the price of 
market childcare, as well as interest rates.   
 
5 Concluding  comment 
 
We have shown how changes in various tax policy instruments – the PIT scale, the LITO, 
ML and FTBs  – have shifted the overall burden of the Australian  income tax system 
toward the middle of the earnings distribution and towards low and average wage two-
earner families.   This direction of reform has been pursued in a labour market with rising 
average wages but increasing earnings inequality, and therefore cannot be supported on 
the basis of conventional equity criteria.  The reforms also run counter to efficiency rules, 
by imposing high tax rates on the second earner, typically the female partner with the 
more responsive labour supply.  
                                                 
23 The result was found to hold across a wide range of model specifications.  The models were estimated on 
a sample that excluded the bottom five per cent of male net incomes, negative female incomes, and the top 
1 per cent of male and female net incomes, to remove the effect of outliers.     
24 An essential feature of the model is that it takes account of the presence of two adults in the household.  
Much of the literature on saving behaviour treats the household as a single decision unit.  See, for example, 
Blundell et al. (1994) and the survey by Browning et al. (1996).  In models of this kind high wage H1 
households are confused with much lower wage H2 households because, in effect, the models fail to control 
for wage rates. The studies therefore miss the strong positive association between female labour supply and 
household saving at a given wage level.   31
 
High tax rates on the second earner are a characteristic of joint income taxation. In a 
detailed analysis of the structure of marginal and average rates we show that most 
Australian families are now taxed on the basis of joint income under an MTR scale that 
exhibits an inverted U-shaped profile.  A system of this kind is widely recognised to have 
strong negative effects on female labour supply and productivity, and therefore on the 
future tax base for funding family support.  
 
The fundamental limitation of the system lies not the level of FTBs, but in its effective 
MTR and ATR structure, created by applying an MTR scale with an inverted U-shaped 
profile to joint income. Taxing families in this way seriously inhibits the reallocation of 
female time from the household to the market during a period of declining fertility and 
therefore of falling demand for domestic labour.  With population ageing, the present 
level of FTBs is therefore likely to become unsustainable due to productivity losses from 
labour supply disincentive effects.  
 
The system is also unfair because it taxes second incomes at very high rates and therefore 
ignores the fact that of two households with the same total household income, where one 
has the second earner working entirely in the market, the other entirely in the household, 
the latter will have a significantly higher standard of living because of its higher level of 
output of household goods and services.  
 
The solution to these limitations of Australia’s “new” income tax system lies in a return 
to the taxation of individual incomes under a progressive rate scale, combined with 
universal family benefits.  There is also an urgent need for public investment in a high 
quality, education oriented, childcare sector, to allow the expansion of female labour and 
to raise the standard of education of the next generation.   The combination of these 
policies can be expected to be more than self-financing, because of the resulting growth 
in the tax base and productivity gains. 
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